Abstract
In this paper, I summarize and defend a model of the Trinity proposed by William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland, which is called trinity monotheism. An important element of this model is that there are two ways to be divine; either one must be a proper part of the Trinity or the Trinity itself. I answer one objection in Daniel Howard-Snyder’s thorough critique of this model. He calls this objection the Diminished Divinity Problem and supposes that if the property of divinity is exemplified in two different ways, either by being a proper part of the Trinity or by being the Trinity, then this implies that the Persons of the Trinity exemplify a lesser divinity than the Trinity itself. I argue that this objection is mistaken in two ways: (1) it is predicated on a misunderstanding of what Craig and Moreland’s analogy is intended to represent and (2) it argues fallaciously that since a cat skeleton is dissimilar to the cat itself, then the Persons of the Trinity are equally as dissimilar to the Trinity itself. With a successful answer to Howard-Snyder’s objection, one of the main tenets of trinity monotheism is upheld, bolstering the plausibility of the model.
Recommended Citation
Watson, Kevin Jr.
(2020)
"Trinity Monotheism and Daniel Howard-Snyder's "Diminished Divinity Problem","
The Corinthian: Vol. 20, Article 8.
Available at:
https://kb.gcsu.edu/thecorinthian/vol20/iss1/8